But he didn't.
A couple of years ago, The Space Review published a two-part article (Part One, Part Two) citing Russian records and resources, including transcripts of the communication between ground crews and the capsule, to explain what really happened on that mission. It's clear from reading the article that Komarov was in trouble, almost as soon as he attained orbit, and his death was due to a design flaw in the parachute mechanism.
This current article is an attempt to use the transcripts, along with other Russian language sources, to offer a new and comprehensive account of this deeply misunderstood mission. The available evidence clearly shows that not only was Komarov not in hysterics, but that he communicated calmly and cogently throughout the mission, and only with people who he was supposed to be in touch with: cosmonaut communicators, flight directors, and chief designers. These transcripts also provide crucial detail on what exactly happened in orbit and how mission control and Komarov tried to bring a very faulty ship under control. The proximate cause of Komarov’s death was clearly a faulty parachute deployment system. But, more broadly, when Komarov boarded his spacecraft for liftoff, the Soyuz spacecraft was incontrovertibly not ready for crewed flight. And some of the blame for the tragedy must fall on three broader factors: political pressure to accomplish a mission in time for several anniversaries in 1967, the need to reassert Soviet dominance in space after a lull, and a management culture that discouraged dissenting voices.It's a solid piece of research into a mission that should never have happened.
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